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Over this  past decade, Congress has 
responded to the growing threat of 
bioterrorism and risks  to  US national 
security with increased funding for 
biosecurity and public  health preparedness. 
This has included investment in domestic 
vaccine  manufacturing capacity by the 
United States government.  As  a result, a 
policy of vaccine production self-sufficiency 
has emerged that should cause policy 
makers  to  pause and ask: “what is  the next 
step?” In the near future, this  policy may 
create a surge of efficient vaccine production 
that current emergency distribution models 
are ill equipped to  manage. This article 
presents  the results of a research project 
aimed at developing a model that could 
serve as  a  strategy for pandemic vaccine 
distribution. It argues that as  the nation 
readied for its first pandemic in forty years, 
i t b e n e f i t e d f r o m i n v e s t m e n t s  i n 
preparedness but s t i l l found i tse l f 
unprepared for the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic 
vaccination campaign.
INTRODUCTION
The nation’s response to the 2009  H1N1 
Pandemic has been  met  with  scrutiny, 
candor,  and a  collaborative effort among 
federal  and state agencies, local public health 
authorities,  associations,  and experienced 
practitioners. The Institutes of Medicine and 
Center  for  Biosecurity  have held conferences 
that  have paved the way  toward improving 
pandemic response. 1  The workshop format 
used at these conferences resulted in  the 
identification and exploration of issues 
relating  to vaccine supply,  administration, 
and distribution  by  both  attendees and 
panelists. However,  after-action vaccine 
distribution discussions failed to result in  an 
overarching implementation  strategy  that 
could be linked to many  elements of a 
coherent  vaccine distribution strategy. This 
article presents a  model  that  could serve as a 
conceptual framework  for  designing  a 
pandemic vaccine distribution policy.
BACKGROUND
Congressional  action has responded to the 
growing threat of bioterrorism  and the 
associated risks to US national  security  by 
increasing  funding for  biosecurity  and public 
health  preparedness.  Among these actions 
has been the investment in  domestic vaccine 
manufacturing  capacity  by  the United States 
government.  As a  result,  a policy  of vaccine 
production self-sufficiency  has emerged that 
should lead policymakers toward the next 
steps in  developing a  vaccine distribution 
strategy. 2 In  the near  future,  this production 
strategy  will create a  surge of vaccine 
production efficiency  that  current emergency 
distribution models are ill equipped to 
manage. This gap between  production and 
distribution capabilities was witnessed in  the 
2009  H1N1  Pandemic  when the limitations of 
the public  health  mass vaccination model 
were recognized and a  distr ibut ion 
infrastructure was assembled to support  a 
vaccination  campaign.3  As a  result, public 
health  planners were encouraged to pursue 
agreements with private sector  providers to 
support  pandemic vaccine distribution. This 
guidance came after  the confirmation  of the 
H1N1  virus on  the North  American  continent 
in April of 2009. 4  
THE PROBLEM
T h e H H S P a n d e m i c p l a n f o r  m a s s 
vaccination  is non-executable,  inadequately 
resourced,5  and lacks a  staffing  strategy  to 
fulfill the goal of vaccinating  300  million 
Americans in  six  months. 6  The US General 
Accountability  Office  (GAO) has reported to 
Congress that  the Health  and Human 
Services (HHS) Pandemic Plan  lacks clarity 
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regarding  the roles and responsibilities of 
states versus the federal  government in 
regards to vaccine distribution. 7   As the 
nation  prepared for  H1N1,  its first  mass 
vaccination  campaign  in  nearly  forty  years, 
the GAO reported to Congress that  GAO 
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s h a d n o t  b e e n 
implemented. 8 This report  came in  the midst 
of a  declared public health emergency.  The 
Association  of State and Territorial Health 
Officers (ASTHO) reported,  in  the aftermath 
of H1N1  Pandemic, that states experienced 
difficulties with  vaccine distribution. 9  Why 
does the nation  not have a  proven vaccine 
distribution system  after  spending  billions on 
pandemic preparedness?
The HHS mass vaccination  plan  is based 
on  the public  health  model,  established in the 
1950s and 1960s,  which  was successful in 
eliminating  infectious diseases while 
controlling numerous other  childhood 
diseases.  The plan  assumed state and local 
public health  personnel  would fulfill the 
distribution function, as they  did in  the 1957 
and 1968  pandemics.  However,  over  the past 
twenty  years, the public  health  vaccinator 
corps has declined,10 and in  the past  decade 
has continued to lose workforce capacity  due 
to state  and local  budget cuts. 11 Thus,  as the 
nation  readied for the H1N1  vaccination 
campaign, public health  no longer  had the 
workforce to sustain  an ambitious,  prolonged 
vaccination  campaign.  In  seeking to mitigate 
the effects of a  gap in  the public  health 
workforce,  Congress passed the Public Health 
Emergency  Response grant  to purchase the 
H1N1  vaccine and support  state and local 
response efforts to hire a  temporary 
vaccinator  workforce. When  attempting  to 
use the grant  funds to support a  range of 
vaccine distribution strategies,  states 
reported several policy  barriers, 12  such  as 
bureaucratic state procurement and hiring 
practices that  lacked a  “fast  track” 
mechanism  to expedite the filling  of 
vacancies during emergency  operations. 
Additional  challenges resulted from  the 
introduction  of web-based applications, 
databases,  and vaccine ordering applications 
that were new  to providers and lacked 
interoperability  with  seasonal  influenza 
vaccine administration systems. 
In  contrast  to the 80 million doses of 
H1N1  Pandemic vaccine dispensed in 2009,13 
the private sector  routinely  distributes 135  to 
140  million  doses of influenza  vaccine each 
flu  season. 14  Given  the limitations of the 
public  health  model  and government’s 
greater  reliance on  the private sector  to 
accomplish  a  “rapid response”  H1N1 
pandemic vaccine distribution, the time has 
come for a  strategic study  of strengths and 
weaknesses of all vaccine distribution 
logistics. This research  project  sought  to 
answer  the question “How  could a  new  model 
be designed to support pandemic vaccine 
distribution for  a  public health  emergency  of 
national significance?” 
If the  current public health  model 
experiences difficulties managing  vaccine 
distribution when  dose volumes are less than 
100 million, then  how  can the nation expect 
its public  health  system  to meet the goal of 
the HHS to distribute 300 million  doses? 
This article proposes a hybrid public/private 
policy  that  could serve as the basis for 
p a n d e m i c  v a c c i n e d i s t r i b u t i o n  a n d 
compliment  the current policy  of vaccine 
production self-sufficiency. 
METHODOLOGY
Policy  analysis was used to evaluate two 
existing  vaccine distribution  models and, 
from  that  analysis,  suggest a  new  hybrid 
model  for  pandemic vaccine distribution 
(PVD).  The analysis examined weakness in 
the current public  and private sector  models, 
identified strengths of those models, and 
developed a new  model that  could better 
achieve the policy  goal of vaccinating  300 
million people in  six  months. Three steps 
were used to evaluate existing private and 
public sector  distribution  models and develop 
a new hybrid model. 
1. The first  step was to identify,  shape, and 
validate model evaluation  criteria  using 
the Delphi method.  Subject  matter 
experts (SME) were interviewed in  two 
rounds: the initial  round was used to 
identify  criteria  and a  second round was 
used to validate the criteria  identified 
from  the first  round. In the second round, 
SME were asked to rate the  relative 
importance of each  criterion, rank order 
all  criteria, and discuss their  rationale for 
the ranked order of each criterion. 
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2. The second step was to evaluate the two 
distribution  models using  the model 
evaluation criteria,  which  were identified 
in the Delphi study.
3. The final step was to develop a new 
distribution model  for  pandemic  vaccine 
distribution.  The new  model  incorporates 
desirable attributes from  the two existing 
models; a  comparative analysis of the 
literature provided context in  which  to 
frame the new model.  
SAMPLE
The Delphi panel  consisted of eleven 
individuals with  professional vaccine 
distribution experience. Individuals selected 
served as subject  matter  experts and 
represented stakeholders who were involved 
in  either  non-emergency  (seasonal)  or 
emergency  (pandemic) vaccine distribution. 
These SME were drawn  from  policy, 
administration,  academic (medical),  state-
level program  operations,  federal  operations, 
and national policy  levels. They  represented 
local,  state, and federal levels of government, 
non-government  organizations and the 
private sector, and the disciplines of medicine 
(as physicians, nurses, or  pharmacists), 
emergency  preparedness, and business.  All 
had extensive experience with  the vaccine 
supply  chain,  including  production, 
distribution,  ordering, and administration.  As 
a  group, their  perspectives represented policy 
and operations,  and the public  and private 
sectors. It  is worth  noting  that  several SME 
had extensive experience in  one sector  but 
worked in  another  sector  at  the time of this 
study,  thus offering  insight  from  both  sectors 
as it  relates to vaccine supply, administration, 
and distribution.
DATA COLLECTION
The survey  instrument  consisted of a  series of 
sixteen  questions.  Questions were grouped 
into one of four  segments and each  interview 
consisted of the  four  segments: (1) SME 
background information; (2) private sector 
model and SME involvement  with  seasonal 
influenza vaccination; (3) pandemic  influenza 
vaccination  and the public  health  model; and 
(4) the ethics of vaccine distribution  during 
public  emergencies.  The first  segment 
established the SME’s experience and 
familiarity  with  vaccination  policy, both 
seasonal and pandemic. It  also offered an 
opportunity  to understand the SME’s 
expertise, with  in-depth  follow-up provided 
in  the subsequent sections of the interview. 
The second segment  focused the discussion 
on  knowledge of and familiarity  and 
experience with  the private sector  model and 
its outcomes. The third segment  focused on 
the public  health  model and provided an 
opportunity  to contrast  strengths and 
weaknesses of this model  with  the private 
sector  model. The fourth  segment  solicited 
discussion of the ethics surrounding vaccine 
distribution.
ANALYSIS
Survey  data  were analyzed to determine those 
themes that  emerged from  the interviews and 
resulted in the identification of enablers (the 
how) and criteria  (the what).  An  enabler  was 
defined as a  process that  supported a 
particular  outcome or  criteria.  Enablers were 
sorted based on  the interview  discussions 
that  related to a major theme.  Criteria  and 
enablers are depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Criteria & Enablers that Influence PVD15
The epidemiological model “web of 
causation”  was used to model and illustrate 
the inter-relationships among  the enablers 
and criteria  (see Figure 1).  First  introduced in 
the 1960s by  MacMahon, Pugh  and Ipsen, the 
web of causation  model  showed relationships 
among  causal  factors of disease. 16 The survey 
conducted for  this study  revealed that several 
factors contributed to the understanding  of 
the dynamics of vaccine distribution.  The 
application  of the epidemiological model 
helped to conceptualize how  the criteria 
relate to each  other  and associated enablers 
for  vaccine distribution.  The next step was to 
use these model  evaluation  criteria  to 
evaluate two current models of vaccine 
distribution: the public  health  model and the 
private sector model. 
TWO MODELS OF VACCINE 
DISTRIBUTION
THE PUBLIC HEALTH MODEL
The public  health  model (PHM) is the 
current,  documented strategy  for mass 
vaccination  when  a  public  health  emergency 
is declared. This guidance, which  dictates 
federal  policy  for  mass vaccination,  dates to 
the 1950s and 1960s when  mass vaccination 
clinics were used to defeat  childhood 
infectious diseases such  as polio,  smallpox, 
etc. In  the first  decade of the twenty-first 
century, the guidance was revised and 
updated,  and then  pushed to state and local 
jurisdictions.  This public health  model  is 
described in  numerous public  health  mass 
prophylaxis planning guidance documents. 
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Figure 2  depicts the public health  model, 
in  which  the federal government is the 
purchaser  and distributor  of pandemic 
vaccine and has the sole responsibility  for 
procurement and distribution  to the states. 
This model is labor  intensive and dependent 
upon  state, local, and tribal departments for 
distribution.  It requires logistics functions, 
such  as warehousing, that are no longer  in 
place for  day-to-day  functions in  most states. 
I n  2 0 0 9 t h i s m o d e l  w a s m o d i f i e d 
dramatically  for  H1N1  pandemic  distribution 
plans,  which  had an  impact on routine 
functions.17  For  example,  centralized 
distribution was incorporated for vaccine 
distribution  and the private sector  was 







Figure 2. Public Health Model18
The evaluation  of the PHM revealed that, 
while the Delphi panelists rated the planning 
guidance high  (see Figure 1),  most  model 
evaluation criteria  were  rated low, including 
the extent to which the guidance was 
executable, scalable,  and provider-centered. 
The criteria  of client-centered and integration 
were assessed as medium.19 During the rating 
of these criteria,  comments were offered by 
SME that provided insights to their 
assessments based on experience. Generally, 
they  believed the public health  model is dated 
and no longer reflects the realities of the 
twenty-first  century.  This view  was stated in 
the context  of the attrition  of the public 
health  workforce, low  dependence on  and 
integration  of untested technologies for 
logistics support,  and a consumer-oriented 
retail service sector. 
Consider  the attrition  of the public  health 
workforce and its capacity  to manage a 
sustained mass vaccination  campaign. 
Enumeration  methodologies used by 
departments of health  to assess the public 
health  nurse workforce across the nation  lack 
consistency, but states with  centralized public 
health  systems have reported declines in  that 
workforce. For  example, in  2009  South 
Carolina  reported that  its workforce over  the 
past  decade decreased from  an  estimated 
1,200  nurses to 461  nurses,  a  decrease of 
nearly  two-thirds. 20 Similar  reductions in  the 
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workforce have further  impacted vaccination 
support  requirements and the capacity  to 
sustain a campaign. 
The public health  model  is built  around 
few  technologies; however, subject matter 
experts cited examples of technologies 
introduced during  the H1N1  pandemic and 
described how  technologies used in  the 
private sector  would aid in  vaccine 
distribution.  For  example, two SME pointed 
out that the distribution  logistics to support 
H1N1  should have been managed by  a  Supply 
Chain  Inventory  Management  system. 
Another  SME described the Centers for 
Disease Control’s (CDC) use of technology  as 
“untested,”  while  another  reported her  state 
had been  using pen,  paper,  and fax  machine 
to manage vaccine distribution  prior  to the 
H1N1  pandemic.  The pandemic  caused the 
state to develop and roll out  a  new  web-based 
technology  ordering  system  for  physician 
practices willing  to administer  the H1N1 
vaccine. This was one state’s experience, but 
there was no one system  used by  all states for 
vaccine ordering  and distribution.  There also 
was no system  in  place for  use by  CDC’s 
contractor,  McKesson  Medical Specialties, 
which  was responsible  for  distributing 
pandemic vaccine to the 90,000 registered 
providers.21 
F ina l ly ,  the publ ic  hea l th  model 
incorporated limited strategies when 
compared to those of a  twenty-first  century 
consumer-oriented retail service  sector.  The 
mass vaccination clinic, according  to 
planning  guidance,  delivers service at  large 
centers. Clients who seek  vaccination  must 
travel  to this site for  a  single service (which  is 
not to say  that many  departments of health 
have not instituted alternative delivery 
methods such  as drive-thru  clinics, rural 
clinics located in  solo-owned pharmacies and 
mall clinics, but  this is not necessarily  a 
component of the traditional public  health 
model). 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR MODEL
A  vaccine is manufactured for  profit  and sold 
to wholesalers and distributors who sell  to 
frontline providers. Over  the past decade, this 
provider  network has expanded to include 
not  only  physician  practices,  but  retail 
pharmacies (chain-owned), grocery  stores, 
and big  box retail outlets as well. It  is 
estimated that a  third of all  annual  flu  vaccine 
is administered through  the retail  sector.22 
The balance is administered through 
physician  practices and community  clinics. 
While  the ability  of this model to distribute 
vaccine is powerful,  its ability  to respond to 
public health  emergencies is limited.  For 
example,  during  periods of vaccine shortage, 
the system  lacks the responsiveness to 
retrieve vaccine and distribute to high-risk 
population groups. Distribution  of the first 
doses of vaccine goes to high-profit  margin, 
bulk buyers.  Under  normal distribution, 
vaccine administration  is offered through 
retail outlets before the healthcare sector 
begins to offer  vaccine to its client  base, 
which  includes both  physicians and public 
sector providers. 
Figure 3  shows the private sector  model 
(PSM) and illustrates the complexity  and 
redundancy  of production,  distribution, and 
wholesaler  and provider  relationships. The 
government  – federal,  state, and local – 
accounts for  less than  10  percent  of the 
activity  in this model.23  Physicians,  at the 
provider  level,  purchase a  vaccine directly 
from  either  a  manufacturer  or  from  a 
wholesaler. That  purchase can  include 
auxiliary  supplies such  as syringes, alcohol 
swabs, and cotton balls. 
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Figure 3. Private Sector Model24 
In  evaluating  the PSM, Delphi panelists 
rated it high  for  three criteria  (see Figure 1): 
it  is executable, scalable, and client-centered. 
With  regards to two criteria  – provider-
centered and integration – the PSM was 
rated as medium, while the federal  planning 
guidance was rated as low. 25 
The limitations of this model to serve as 
public policy  are twofold: it  fails to reach 
p o p u l a t i o n  t a r g e t s t h a t a r e e i t h e r 
geographically  remote and/or high-risk. The 
model offers limited reach into remote rural 
areas not  served by  large corporations with 
franchise networks. For  example,  while 
corporate retail  pharmacies (such  as CVS, 
Walgreens and Rite Aid)  are members of the 
network, locally  owned pharmacies in  remote 
areas are not  served by  the pharmaceutical 
corporate structure.  Therefore,  these 
communities, in  all likelihood, are not  served 
by  this service delivery  model and would also 
be underserved in  emergency  distribution. 
The second limitation  of the model  is that it 
does not incorporate a  community  outreach 
component that  serves high-risk population 
groups,  such  as the homebound or 
uninsured.  Vaccination  rates among the 
uninsured,  underinsured,  and geographically 
remote population  groups are underachieved 
by this model due to limited accessibility.
RESULTS OF THE DELPHI PANEL
Three major  findings were drawn  from  this 
analysis of the public health  model  and the 
private sector  model: (1) the PHM is not 
executable; (2) there are statutory, regulatory 
and licensure barrier  to using  alternative 
healthcare professionals as vaccinators; and 
(3) the United States lacks a  comprehensive 
policy for pandemic vaccine distribution.
1.  THE HHS PANDEMIC VACCINATION PLAN 
IS NOT EXECUTABLE
The evaluation  of the public health  model 
illustrated the limitations of pandemic 
vaccine distribution (PVD) due primarily  to 
insufficient public  health  workforce capacity. 
The weaknesses of the  current  federal 
pandemic plan  for  distribution  were revealed 
when  the nation responded to the 2009  H1N1 
pandemic.  Public health  did not  have the 
expected infrastructure to support  mass 
vaccination  as called for  in the federal 
guidance to meet the HHS goal.  It is the 
public health  nurse workforce that has served 
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as the  key  personnel  in  past  mass vaccination 
efforts. As a  result,  Public  Health  Emergency 
Response (PHER) grants were used to 
supplement  the staffing  limitations of state 
and local departments of health  (DoH) and 
the private healthcare sector was recruited to 
assist with vaccination.
2.  THERE EXIST STATUTORY, REGULATORY, 
AND LICENSURE BARRIERS TO USING 
ALTERNATIVE HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 
AS VACCINATORS
An alternative workforce capacity  must  be 
identified and readied for  emergency  mass 
vaccination  to supplement  the decline in  the 
public health  nurse workforce.  But regulatory 
complexities (such  as limited scope of 
practice)  restrict  recruitment of alternative 
health  professionals as vaccinators, especially 
during an  emergency. The pharmacy 
profession has been  readying  pharmacists for 
the role of vaccinator over  the past  sixteen 
years,  and this has been coupled with  the 
expansion  of retail  pharmacy  flu  clinics. 
While  public  health  was slow  to adopt the 
pharmacist  vaccinator  as a  partner  for 
emergency  mass vaccination during  the H1N1 
campaign, other  factors also limited the 
adoption  of pharmacists as vaccinators. 
These issues – scope of practice and medical 
control  – limit the ability  of other  allied 
health  professions (dentists, paramedics,  or 
veterinarians) to serve as vaccinators as well. 
States have authority  over  issues of medical 
control  and could resolve such  barriers.  But 
each  state must  identify  and address barriers 
that  surround the statutory  regulatory  issues 
that  limit  the use of allied healthcare 
professionals as vaccinators. 
3.  THE NATION LACKS A COMPREHENSIVE 
POLICY FOR PANDEMIC VACCINE 
DISTRIBUTION
While  the United States is progressing  toward 
vaccine production  self-sufficiency, little 
progress has been  made on  the distribution 
side. The CDC has distribution  projects 
underway, such  as the Vaccine Management 
Business Improvement Project  (VMBIP),26 
begun in  2003.  Elements of VMBIP were 
adapted for  the H1N1  pandemic.  But  federal 
planning  guidance for  mass vaccination is 
driven  by  US dependency  on traditional 
vaccine production  techniques and offshore 
sources that traditionally  have produced an 
unreliable vaccine supply.  As the US policy  of 
vaccine production self-sufficiency  produces 
a  more re l iab le supply  o f vacc ine , 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y 
implementation strategies will  be merited. 
Policy  strategies should be amended for  a 
time when  vaccine distribution  will  not be 
based on  scarce allocation  schemes or  vaccine 
rationing, but instead will  be based on 
vaccine self-sufficiency. In  light of the 2009 
H1N1  pandemic  and as new  vaccine 
production technologies come online,  the 
discussion of distribution  policy  ought to 
consider  what the nation’s pandemic  vaccine 
system should look like. 
A  policy  for  pandemic  vaccine distribution 
should include strategies that  strengthen the 
distribution  model and enhance herd 
immunity. Extensive guidance exists for 
vaccine administration  to target groups; this 
achieves the ethical principle of social justice 
while managing  who gets vaccinated.  What is 
absent in  the model and its guidance is how  a 
vaccine is distributed (strategies),  where the 
vaccine is distributed (venues), and by  whom 
(vaccinators). 
A NEW MODEL FOR PANDEMIC 
VACCINE DISTRIBUTION
Based on  this evaluation  of the public health 
and the private  sector  models, a  new  model 
can  be developed. It  is a  public-private 
partnership that  builds upon current private 
sector  relationships by  incorporating  the 
distribution component  for pandemic events 
where vaccination  is the mitigation  strategy. 
It builds on  decades of the United States 
government and s tate governments 
partnering with  the private sector  to 
implement  a  cost-effective, policy-based 
vaccine supply  for  such  programs as Vaccine 
for  Children (VFC), 27  and the more recent 
response to H1N1.  A  partnership with  the 
pharmaceutical industry  has existed in  one 
form  or  another  since the 1950s but has been 
limited to the supply  of vaccines.  The 
pharmaceutical industry  has the production 
capacity; what  has been missing is a  private 
sector-driven medical  logistics capability.  The 
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2009  H1N1  mass vaccination  campaign 
demonstrated a  core competency  of the 
private sector  – its centralized distribution 
capability  – that  had been  a  key  component 
in seasonal flu campaigns. 
Figure 4  depicts the public-private 
partnership model  for  pandemic vaccine 
distribution (PVD). The federal government 
is the purchaser  but  contracts with  the 
private sector for  both  vaccine production 
and distribution  logistics in  pandemic events. 
The federal government,  in  concert  with  state 
and local departments of health, collaborates 
with,  recruits,  and registers the provider 
network in advance of a public health 
emergency. This last element was introduced 
during  the 2009  H1N1  pandemic vaccination 
campaign. However,  the wholesalers and,  to a 
great  extent,  the large purchasers  (shown  in 
Figure 3) critical for  distribution to providers 
in  the private  sector  model were removed 
from  the supply  chain.  This hybrid model 
restores,  to some extent,  the private sector 
components of the distribution  network  that 
are missing  in  the public health  model  but 
prominent  in  the private sector  model.  It 
expands vaccination  venues by  incorporating 
retail  sector  in-store clinics,  pharmacies, 
grocery  stores, and big  box  sites – a  concept 
supported by retail executives. 28 
Centralized distribution  is critical  in  this 
model because it  replaces the labor-intensive 
distribution function inherent  in the public 
health  model that, due to attrition,  is either 
diminished or  no longer  operational.  Central 
distribution includes a  warehousing  function, 
where product is received, an  inventory  and 
data  system,  and a shipping and transport 
function.  An  additional essential  component 
is cold-chain management;29  the ability  to 
monitor  temperature fluctuation  during 
transport  may  compromise vaccine efficacy. 
F i n a l l y ,  t h i s s y s t e m  i n c o r p o r a t e s 
performance metrics to ensure private sector 















Figure 4. Public Private Partnership for PVD
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To distribute the H1N1  vaccine,  McKesson 
Specialty  Care Solutions assembled four 
depots in  six  weeks,30  strategically  located 
throughout the United States. 31  The five 
pharmaceutical  manufacturers shipped 
vaccine to these locations,  where it  was 
inventoried and stored.  The CDC provider 
network orders were pulled from  depot 
inventory  but the data  systems used by  states 
were a  patchwork of systems that fed into the 
CDC. As explained by  Delphi panelists,  the 
supply-side ordering  system  (a  pull system) 
competed with  the manufacturing system  (a 
push system).32  What  was missing  from  the 
H1N1  application  was a  supply  chain 
management  system.  Aspects of the CDC 
VMBIP project  had yet  to be implemented 
but project  elements will  eventually 
standardize an ordering system  to be used by 
all  states and US territories. (McKesson  filled 
H1N1  vaccine orders the day  they  were 
received and delivered vaccines the next  day. 
This metric was assessed daily, weekly, and 
monthly.)  
The hybrid model leverages private sector 
resources to achieve the goal of herd 
immunity  during a  public  health  emergency 
of national significance. The public and 
private sectors both work  toward delivering  a 
public good by  building  on their core 
competencies. The public  sector,  through  the 
federal  government, serves as the lead 
partner  coordinating activity  among  federal 
agencies, state governments, vaccine advisory 
c o m m i t t e e s ,  a n d p h a r m a c e u t i c a l 
manufacturers. The private sector  uses its 
production capabilities,  the strength of its 
logistics support technology,  and a contracted 
reasonable cost to the public  sector  to 
accomplish  the public  health  goal.  The 
private sector  is protected legally  and fulfills 
its social responsibility  as a  contributing 
corporate citizen. The public sector  meets its 
mandate to provide for the common good.
Planning  doctrine, published for  public 
health  emergencies of national significance, 
should be written  to support this hybrid 
model. It  builds on  the network  of providers 
used for  seasonal influenza  vaccinations and 
leverages the full scope of the private sector 
for  both distribution  and administration  of 
vaccine. Additionally,  it  recruits,  prepares, 
and readies a network of “emergency” 
vaccinators or  non-traditional vaccinators 
supplementing  tradit ional providers 
(illustrated in  Figure  4) as the provider 
network. The new  hybrid model integrates 
the public health  system  and its emphasis on 
target  populations with  the broad net  cast by 
the private sector  to maximize vaccine 
distribution.  This policy  strategy  ensures the 
emergency  distribution  of vaccine by 
maximizing  geographical reach  and using  a 
f u l l  r a n g e o f v e n u e s f o r  v a c c i n e 
administration  in a  given  community. It also 
follows the policy  and practice of emergency 
management  for  preparedness,  response, and 
recovery  and reflects National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) guidance.
BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION
There currently  exist  several  barriers to 
implementing the hybrid model.  These 
include scope-of-practice restrictions on 
potential vaccinators,  the lack of an 
integrated distribution  system  that  works for 
seasonal and pandemic  vaccines,  and the 
need for  a  formal public-private partnership 
for  pandemic response. This section  presents 
three recommendations for  removing  or 
mitigating those barriers. 
Recommendation 1. States, in  cooperation 
with  HHS and health  and medical specialty 
associations,  should change scope of practice 
restrictions that  block disciplines from 
serving  as vaccinators in  declared public 
health  emergencies where vaccination is the 
mitigation strategy.
The nation  has a  corps of health  and medical 
professionals with  the skill  set and desire to 
assist  during emergency  operations. The 
limitations and barriers to deploy  health  and 
medical  personnel  in  the aftermath  of 
Hurricane Katrina revealed the legal, 
licensing, and practice constraints.33  These 
issues were visited again  in  an  attempt  to 
deploy  vaccinators for  the 2009  H1N1 
pandemic. 34
State statutes define the scope of practice 
for  these professionals. However, there are 
legal,  regulatory, and licensure restrictions 
that  limit health  and medical professionals 
from  serving  as vaccinators in  public health 
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emergencies.  These became apparent  during 
the H1N1 mass vaccination campaign. 
This recommendation  addresses the 
quagmire of restrictions. It  expands the non-
traditional vaccinator’s scope of practice to 
include this skill set  for  public  health 
emergencies.  The scope of practice is a  state 
responsibility, but  HHS should serve as lead 
facilitator  (which would be not  unlike its role 
in  the past),  providing  the incentives and 
mechanisms for  states to upgrade laws 
pertaining to state emergency powers. 
Recommendation 2. The United States 
government  should support  an  integrated 
vaccine distribution infrastructure that works 
for  both  seasonal influenza  and pandemic 
influenza.
A n  i n t e g r a t e d v a c c i n e d i s t r i b u t i o n 
infrastructure could be used each  influenza 
season and when  a public health  emergency 
requires a  mass vaccination  strategy. This 
recommendation  has been  made in  the past, 
serves as recommended policy  in  Canada, 
and is currently  practiced in  the Province of 
Ontario. The Department of Health  and 
Human  Services must  understand that  its 
investments on the supply  side are 
insufficient if,  in  an  event,  supplies are not 
efficiently  distributed to those in  need. 
Delphi panelists described how  their  family 
members could not  get an  H1N1  shot, despite 
warehouses they  managed full of vaccine 
doses.  The public  health  model has 
distribution barriers that  should be 
addressed and resolved if the intended 
outcome is improved uptake rates and 
biosecurity.  Thus,  an  integrated distribution 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f f e r s d u a l - p u r p o s e 
application.
Recommendation 3. The United States 
g o v e r n m e n t  s h o u l d e s t a b l i s h  a 
comprehensive public-private partnership for 
pandemic vaccine distribution  that achieves 
the HHS goal and facilitates a rapid response.
Pandemic response should not stop at 
vaccine production self-sufficiency.  It  should 
incorporate a  distribution  policy  that 
supports the vaccine supply  chain from 
production  through  distribution  and 
administration  to individuals. A  policy  of 
vaccine distribution  would complement the 
policy of vaccine production self-sufficiency. 
A STRATEGIC POLICY FOR 
PANDEMIC VACCINE 
DISTRIBUTION
The new  hybrid model serves as the 
implementation strategy  for a  strategic policy 
that  targets pandemic  vaccine distribution 
(PVD). This final section  describes the 
strategy  and the six  strategic goals drawn 
from  the findings of this analysis. Finally, a 
framework is presented that  outlines a policy 
for pandemic vaccine distribution. 
THE POLICY STRATEGY
The United States government has invested 
$7.1  billion  in  pandemic preparedness,  of 
which  $3.2  billion  was invested in  enhancing 
vaccine production, 35  including  expanded 
capacity  and new  technology  for  cell-based 
vaccine. In the near  future,  the return  on 
investment will be realized,  but  funding 
investments should be redirected into PVD 
infrastructure projects.  For example,  $176 
million is used annually  for  egg  embryos to 
sustain  the egg-based vaccine production 
process of the 1940s. 36  Once cell-based 
vaccine technology  is proficient, these 
investments could be redirected to offset 
costs to improve distribution  strategies. One 
such  project could assist  states and medical 
associations to review  statutory  and licensure 
barriers that  prohibit non-traditional 
professionals with  vaccination skill sets from 
administering  vaccinations in a  declared 
public health emergency.
A  policy  strategy  directed toward 
distribution, accompanied by  similar 
investments and initiatives,  should be 
pursued.  It  should incorporate six  key  goals 
t h a t  d r a w  f r o m  t h i s a n a l y s i s .  T h e 
r e c o m m e n d e d p o l i c y  p a r a l l e l s t h e 
Congress ional Budget  Of f ice (CBO) 
document U.S.  Policy Regarding Pandemic-
Influenza Vaccines,37  which details the US 
strategy  for  achieving  vaccine production 
self-sufficiency.  
T h e s t r a t e g y  i s t o e s t a b l i s h  a 
comprehensive public-private partnership for 
PVD that  can achieve the HHS goal. The 
objective of this approach  is to incorporate an 
executable staffing  strategy  for  the HHS goal 
stated in  the 2005  pandemic plan and its 
claim “to facilitate rapid response.” 38 
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POLICY GOALS
Six specific policy  goals offer  guidance to 
p o l i c y m a k e r s a n d p l a n n e r s i n  t h e 
development of a new model. 
1. Augment  the current  emergency 
mass vaccination plan with  a  staffing 
model  sufficiently  sized to meet the 
mass vaccination goal. 
This first  goal  is predicated on a staffing 
strategy  that  supports the HHS goal to 
vaccinate 300  million Americans in  six 
months. Three enablers are crucial to support 
an  executable mass vaccination  plan.  These 
included a publicly  funded vaccination 
campaign, a  staffing  strategy  or model, and 
technology  that  would sustain  the ordering, 
distribution,  and metrics requirements.  H1N1 
was a publicly  funded campaign  and, while 
federal  guidance implies that  a  campaign 
could be publicly  funded, there is currently 
no policy  that  supports publicly  funded 
campaigns. Actions of the government  show 
that  it will fund medical  countermeasure 
purchase and distribution,  but the key 
enabler is a staffing model sized for response. 
2. Expand the vaccinator  corps to 
support  the staffing of multiple venues 
with  a mechanism  that  permits 
capacity to expand or contract. 
The second goal is to develop a  vaccinator 
corps that can  provide the workforce capacity 
for  the staffing  model  called for  in  the first 
goal. It  expands the current  model to include 
non-tradit ional vaccinators such  as 
pharmacists, paramedics, dentists, and even 
veterinarians. This goal advocates for 
primary  care physicians with  an  emphasis on 
the medical home,39 but  recognizes that, in  a 
medical  emergency, this network  is 
insufficient to reach  most Americans. 
Therefore, multiple venues must be 
i n c o r p o r a t e d i n  t h e n e t w o r k .  T h i s 
dependence builds on  the traditional public 
health  model and adds non-traditional 
venues such as pharmacies, in-store retail 
clinics, and the workplace. 
The public health  mass vaccination model 
is built around 3,036  local  and tribal 
departments of health. 40  In  contrast, 
Walgreens reports 7,100 pharmacies and CVS 
boasts another  3,000 pharmacies, most  of 
which  give flu  shots. 41  This contrast 
illustrates the scalability  of the private sector 
resources used for  the seasonal flu  campaign 
that  could be tapped for pandemic mass 
vaccination. 
3. Adopt  client-centered strategies to 
maximize vaccination rates. 
To maximize vaccination  rates,  mass 
vaccination  campaigns should take advantage 
of client  familiarity  and routine behavior, 
convenience, and accessibility.  Nations that 
have cultivated client-centered strategies 
experience greater  vaccination uptake.  For 
example,  Canada reported the highest H1N1 
vaccination  rates in the world at  46  percent,42 
while the United States reported 27 percent. 43
Customer  convenience and accessibility 
has attracted the attention  of retailers hosting 
in-store clinics and vaccination  is a  service 
that  has become part of the retail mix. To 
illustrate this point,  consider  this statement 
published in  a  California  Health  Care 
Foundation  report: “Retail companies are 
ready  to cater  to this new  kind of healthcare 
consumer  by  offering  what they  believe their 
shoppers want: convenient  basic  medical 
service at a fair price, stated in advance.” 44
A  strategy  used in seasonal flu  campaigns 
is point-to-point service.  This is similar  to the 
practice instituted by  Southwest Airlines that 
has contributed to its success.  Southwest  and 
manufacturers understand that  airline 
commuters seek transportation that will take 
them  from  home to their destination  without 
layover  and that  smaller  aircraft  can 
a c c o m m o d a t e i n c r e a s e d f r e q u e n c y . 
Manufacturers build more,  smaller  aircraft. 
Southwest  uses these aircraft to service the 
same routes with  greater  frequency  to 
accommodate passengers.  This contrasts with 
the current  “hub-and-spoke”  system  used by 
most airlines. 
Concentrating  resources and setting  up 
clinics only  in  public facilities or  establishing 
a  “mass vaccination center”  is, from  a  client 
perspective,  a  hub-and-spoke system. In 
contrast,  clinics in  the workplace, pharmacy, 
or  retail  store are examples of point-to-point 
service.  This is the essence of the client-
centered strategies used to maximize 
vaccination rates in Canada. 
The public  health  model  is not  built 
around client-centered strategies that 
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encourage high  vaccination  rates.  The public 
image of a  public  health  mass vaccination 
center  involves long  lines,  lengthy  wait  times, 
traffic congestion,  and few  conveniences. As a 
result,  this model  may  do more to discourage 
vaccination than to enhance uptake. 
4. Adopt  provider-centered strategies 
to recruit  and expand the traditional 
provider network.  
Explicit strategies to encourage and 
maximize both  traditional and non-
traditional provider  participation  in  public 
heal th  emergency  mass vacc inat ion 
campaigns must be developed.  The seasonal 
flu  campaign  models a number  of these 
strategies while,  in  contrast, the public  health 
model (PHM) for  mass vaccination  is void of 
such  innovations. As a  result, the PHM was 
limited in  its efforts to recruit  participation 
by  private physician  practices until  H1N1. 
The challenge for  the public  sector  is how  to 
incorporate incentives in  a  model  for 
pandemic response that  approximates the 
inherent  strengths of the public  sector  model 
but  encourages physic ians,  through 
incentives, to adopt  immunization  practices. 
For  example,  public  funding  is one incentive 
that  could be strengthened by  including an 
administrative reimbursement fee for 
patients whose insurance does not  cover such 
expenses.
5. Adopt  an  implementation strategy 
that  supports an  integrated vaccine 
distribution  infrastructure and view 
each  seasonal campaign as an exercise 
for pandemic response.  
It has been  decades since public health  last 
managed a  pandemic using  the public health 
model as its sole strategy  and, at  that  time, it 
h a d t h e w o r k f o r c e n e e d e d f o r 
implementation.  The integration  concept 
argues that  public  health  no longer  has the 
capacity  to sustain  a  separate model for 
pandemic vaccine distribution  and must 
develop alternative strategies.  The “blended” 
model incorporated for  H1N1  was an 
alternative model, and the Vaccine for 
Children program  (VFC) represents yet 
another model from  which  elements were 
adopted for the H1N1 campaign. 
Integration  suggests pandemic  response 
be developed around a  single  model; this 
represents a  philosophical shift  of strategy 
from  that  described in  current planning 
guidance.  In  a  review  of H1N1  barriers,45 the 
Association  of State and Territorial Health 
Officers (ASTHO)  recommended use of 
normal distribution  channels. According  to 
ASTHO,  the initial limited supplies could 
have been  sent to the public  health 
departments using  the CDC identified 
priority  vaccination  providers (e.g.,  those 
participating in VFC).
6. Expand federal planning guidance to 
incorporate proactive distribution 
strategies. 
Most  published federal planning  guidance for 
mass vaccination  is driven by  US dependency 
on  traditional production  techniques and 
offshore sources that  contribute to unreliable 
vaccine supplies. Thus, considerable 
emphasis is placed on vaccine rationing,  such 
as the CDC priority  targets. This article 
argues that with  the establishment  of the US 
policy  of vaccine production self-sufficiency, 
a  time will  come when vaccine production 
will be more reliable.  Future strategies should 
be accompanied by  federal planning  guidance 
to assist  state and local  planners with the 
development of plans that  are both 
comprehensive and identify  the resources 
necessary to accomplish the goal. 
A POLICY FRAMEWORK
The framework for the development of a 
policy  for  US pandemic influenza  vaccine 
distribution,  depicted in  Figure 5, provides a 
starting  point  for  discussion. It  represents a 
composite of strengths identified from  the 
analysis of vaccine distribution  models used 
in  the United States for  either  emergency 
vaccination  (e.g., pandemic) or  the seasonal 
influenza campaign.
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1. What Makes the U.S. Pandemic Plan Executable
a. A publicly funded campaign
b. The staffing model strategy
c. An implementation philosophy for an integrated system
d. The use of new technology
• Vaccine Management Business Improvement Project
• Supply Chain Inventory Management System
2. The Scalability for Pandemic Response
a. A robust vaccinator corps
• Physicians and the emphasis of the medical home
• Allied health professionals ready to serve in new roles





c. How technology may offer vaccine production scalability
3. Adoption of a Client-centered Approach to Vaccination Practices
a. The medical home remains the first choice
b. Point-to-Point service
• The workplace clinic for most Americans
• Retail sector in-store clinics, pharmacies
c. The role of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
4. Adoption of Provider-centered Approach to Maximize Vaccination Rates
a. Improved communication with an expanded provider  network  addresses issues of  efficacy, safety  and 
contraindications
b. Insure a single vaccine ordering system compatible for states with electronic interfaces
c. Expand provider  network by  offering tax  breaks for  registered participants who administer vaccine 
during a public health emergency
5. An Integrated Vaccine Distribution System
a. A single vaccination distribution system
b. Exercised annually through the seasonal campaign
c. Optimal readiness at all times
• Act of bioterrorism
• Emerging infectious disease
• Influenza pandemic
6. Federal Planning Guidance
a. Vaccine Production: A policy for vaccine production self-sufficiency
b. Vaccine  Administration: A multidisciplinary, collaborative approach  to provide guidance for  safe and 
effective vaccine practices.
c. Vaccine  Distribution: A  performance  based system to transport vaccine from manufacturer  to provider 
front door.
Figure 5. Framework for U.S. Policy: Pandemic Vaccine Distribution46
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CONCLUSION
How  does this new  hybrid model fit  into the 
current discourse on  mass vaccination 
strategy? This article has briefly  described the 
progress that has been  made toward vaccine 
production self-sufficiency  and demonstrated 
that  vaccine administration  guidance is well 
documented. 47  What has not progressed is 
the process of vaccine distribution  for 
emergencies.  Three distinct  processes should 
define  a  US pandemic response using 
vaccination  as the mitigation strategy: 
production,  distribution, and administration. 
These three processes are conceptualized in 
Figure 6  as a  triangle, which  illustrates the 
equivalency  of the relationships among  the 
three vaccination  processes.  The three sides 
form  an  interdependent  triangular  network, 
each  equal  but requiring  a  body  of knowledge 




















Figure 6. Vaccination: A Triangular Network of Interdependencies
Each  process is distinctive and warrants a 
body  of work essential for  success; however, 
the interdependency  of all three is necessary 
to achieve herd immunity  during a  public 
health  emergency. The public-private 
p a r t n e r s h i p f o r  p a n d e m i c  v a c c i n e 
distribution offers a  model for  developing  the 
distribution process. It  becomes the building 
block that  compliments the HHS pandemic 
plan and contributes to an  executable 
vaccination model.
V a c c i n e d i s t r i b u t i o n s h o u l d b e 
differentiated from  vaccine administration  in 
federal planning guidance. Too often  in 
guidance,  distribution  is discussed in  the 
context  of vaccine administration while the 
discussion focuses exclusively  on  protocols 
for  vaccine inoculation.  If the discussion  were 
framed in  the context  of the National 
Incident Management  System  (NIMS) and 
incident  command (ICS),  vaccine distribution 
would be a  function  of logistics, whereas 
vaccine administration  is a  function of the 
operations section. A  public  policy  should be 
adopted that differentiates between  these 
functions and establishes a  deliberate course 
of action. It  should build on  current 
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capabilities while encouraging  constructive 
change of distribution limitations. 
This article has presented a  new  hybrid 
model  that  could serve as a  conceptual 
f ra m e w o rk  f o r  a  p a n d e m i c va c c i n e 
distribution policy.  Six  goals were outlined 
based on the findings of the  analysis of two 
existing  vaccine distribution models: the 
public health  model (pandemic  influenza) 
and the private sector  model (seasonal 
influenza). The new  hybrid model builds 
upon  the strengths and weaknesses within 
each  of these and serves as the basis for  a 
strategic  implementation  policy  for  pandemic 
vaccine distribution. 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Tom Russo trained in emergency management, 
publ ic heal th , homeland securi ty , and 
organization management and is an emergency 
preparedness  planner for Region 6 of the  South 
Carolina Department of Health & Environmental 
Control. He  has nearly thirty years  of strategic 
planning, project management, and professional 
development experience, sixteen of which have 
been with public health. Russo holds the  Certified 
Emergency Manager (CEM) credential from the 
International Association of Emergency 
Managers and graduated from the  Naval 
Postgraduate  School's Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security with a master's  degree  in 
homeland security studies.
RUSSO, PANDEMIC VACCINE POLICY   16
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8 , ARTICLE 4 (FEBRUARY 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
RUSSO, PANDEMIC VACCINE POLICY   17
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8 , ARTICLE 4 (FEBRUARY 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
1 Institute of Medicine, The 2009 H1N1 Influenza Vaccination Campaign: Summary of a Workshop Series 
(Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2010); Center for Biosecurity at University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center, “The 2009 H1N1 Experience: Policy Implications for Future Infectious Disease Emergencies” (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, March 5, 2010), http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/events/
2010_h1n1/index.html; http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12992
2 Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office (CBO), U.S. Policy Regarding Pandemic-influenza 
Vaccines (September 2008), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/95xx/doc9573/09-15-PandemicFlu.pdf.
3 Center for Biosecurity, “The 2009 H1N1 Experience.” 
4 Kamran Khan, “Spread of a Novel Influenza A (H1N1) Virus via Global Airline Transportation,” New England 
Journal of Medicine 361 (July 9, 2009): 212-214, http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc0904559. 
5 Jessica Zigmond, “H1N1 Outbreak Exposes Shortcomings,” Modern Healthcare, December 15, 2009, http://
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20091215/REG/312159980/. 
6 Thomas P. Russo, “Strategic Policy for Pandemic Vaccine Distribution” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, C.A., September 2010).
7 Janet Heinrich, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Health and the Subcommitte on Oversight and 
Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, Flu Vaccine: Recent Supply 
Shortages Underscore Ongoing Challenges, GAO-05-177T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 
November 18, 2004), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05177t.pdf. 
8 Bernice Steinhardt, Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, US House of Representatives, 
Influenza Pandemic: Gaps in Pandemic Planning and Preparedness Need to be Addressed, GAO-09-909T 
(Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, July 29, 2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09909t.pdf. 
9 Association of State and Territorial Health Officers (ASTHO), Assessing Policy Barriers to Effective Public Health 
Response in the H1N1 Influenza Pandemic: Project Report to the Centers for Disease Control and Preventions 
(Arlington, VA: ASTHO, June 2010), http://www.astho.org/Display/AssetDisplay.aspx?id=4933 
10 Public health nurses have historically served as the primary vaccination corps but their numbers have dwindled 
steadily. For example, it is estimated that in one state, nurses have decreased by 60 percent. See Russo, “Strategic 
Policy for Pandemic Vaccine Distribution,” 20-22. 
11 Association of State and Territorial Health Officers, 2007 State Public Health Workforce Shortage Report 
(Arlington, VA: ASTHO, 2008), http://www.astho.org/Display/AssetDisplay.aspx?id=500.
12 Ibid. 
13 Children were administered two doses, which increased the doses dispensed to 90 million. United Press 
International, “40M doses of H1N1 to be Destroyed,” UPI.com, July 1, 2010, http://www.upi.com/Health_News/
2010/07/01/40M-doses-of-H1N1-vaccine-to-be-destroyed/UPI-21031278020648/.
14 Health Industry Distributors Association, “Flu vaccine planning kit for the healthcare supply chain, 2009-2010. flu 
vaccine business practices initiative,” ( September 18 2009), http://www.flusupplynews.com/documents/
HIDA2009FluVaccinePlanningKit-SeasonalandH1N1_000.pdf
15 Russo, “Strategic Policy for Pandemic Vaccine Distribution.” 
16 B. MacMahon, T.F. Pugh, J Ipsen, Epidemiologic Methods, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1960). 
17 ASTHO, Assessing Policy Barriers to Effective Public Health Response.
18 Russo, “Strategic Policy for Pandemic Vaccine Distribution,” 72.   
19 Ibid., 94, for a summary of strengths and weaknesses enablers as they relate to the model evaluation criteria. 
20 Ibid.,” 21.
RUSSO, PANDEMIC VACCINE POLICY   18
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8 , ARTICLE 4 (FEBRUARY 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
21 McKesson Newsroom, “CDC Expands Existing Vaccine Distribution Partnership with McKesson to Include H1N1 




22 Onora Lien, Beth Maldin, Crystal Franco, and Gigi Kwik Gronvall, “Getting Medicine to Millions: New Strategies for  
Mass Distribution,” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science 4, no. 2 (2006): 
176-182.
23 Research Triangle Institute, “Influenza Vaccine: Who Buys it and Who Sells it,” Issue brief written for Assistant 
DHH Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (Washington, DC: Department of Health an Human Services, October 
2005), http://aspe.hhs.gov/pic/fullreports/06/8476-3.doc. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Russo, “Strategic Policy for Pandemic Vaccine Distribution,” 117 for a summary of strengths and weaknesses as 
they relate to the model evaluation criteria. 
26 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Vaccine Management Business Improvement Project (VMBIP),” 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vmbip/default.htm#what 
27 Vaccine for Children (VFC) is a comprehensive childhood program to ensure all children are immunized against 
infectious diseases. VFC reflects federal policy as it relates to the provision of vaccine for children with eligibility 
under Medicaid, uninsured, underinsured or Native Americans. VFC is administered through the states by providers 
that register and agree to comply with federal program guidance.
28 Lien, et al., “Getting Medicine to Millions,” 176-182.
29 Cold-chain management is “maintaining proper vaccine temperatures during storage and handling to preserve 
potency.” See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Guidelines for Maintaining and Managing the Vaccine 
Cold Chain,” MMWR Weekly 52, no. 42 (October 24, 2003); 1023-1025, http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/mm5242a6.htm. 
30 The four McKesson depots included Memphis, Tennessee; Sacramento, California; Suwanee, Georgia; and 
Fairfield, Ohio.
31 CDC contracts with McKesson Specialty Care Solutions, a division of McKesson Corporation for distribution of 
vaccine in support of the Vaccine for Children program. This contract was expanded to support distribution of the 
2009 H1N1 pandemic vaccine.
32 The vaccine supply side was a push system (pushing vaccine from manufacturers to McKesson) while the state/CDC 
system was a pull system (pulling orders from the provider network). The private sector uses a supply chain inventory  
management system to manage this push/pull dynamic of distribution. 
33 Denise Santiago, “Assessment of Public Health Infrastructure to Determine Public Health Preparedness” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March, 2006).
34 Brooke Courtney, Ryan Morhard, Nidhi Bouri, and Anita Cicero, “Expanding Practitioner Scopes of Practice During 
Public Health Emergencies: Experiences from the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Vaccination Efforts,” Biosecurity and 
Bioterrorism 8, no. 3 (2010): 223-231. 




39 Family and pediatric physician specialties have adopted the patient-centered medical home. Public health has 
adopted this policy to support private sector, family-oriented practices. 
RUSSO, PANDEMIC VACCINE POLICY   19
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8 , ARTICLE 4 (FEBRUARY 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
40 Department of Health and Human Services, “Public Health and Healthcare Sector-Specific Plan: Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan,” (Redacted), (May 2007) http://www.hhs.gov/aspr/opeo/cip/healthssp_08_508.pdf; Research Triangle 
Institute, “Influenza Vaccine: Who Buys it and Who Sells it.”
41 Timothy W. Martin, “Retailers Jockey to Market Swine-flu Shots,” Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2009, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704134104574624212276243276.html; CVS CareMark, “CVS/pharmacy 
to Hold Flu Clinics in Over 3,000 Stores,” September 17 2009, http://info.cvscaremark.com/newsroom/press-
releases/cvspharmacy-hold-flu-clinics-over-3000-stores.
42 Ken Scott, Public Health Agency of Canada, personal interview with the author, April 9, 2010.
43 Trust for America’s Health, “Fighting Flu Fatigue,” November 2010, http://healthyamericans.org/report/78/
flu-2010. 
44 Mary Kate Scott, Health Care in the Fast Lane: Retail Clinics to Mainstream (California HealthCare Foundation, 
September, 2007), 18, http://www.chcf.org/publications/2007/09/health-care-in-the-express-lane-retail-clinics-go-
mainstream. 
45 ASTHO, Assessing Policy Barriers to Effective Public Health Response, 107.
46 Russo, “Strategic Policy for Pandemic Vaccine Distribution,” 122.
47 Ibid., 43. 
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by  the author(s).  Homeland Security Affairs is an academic 
journal  available free of charge to individuals  and institutions. Because the purpose 
of this publication  is the widest possible dissemination  of knowledge, copies of this 
journal  and the articles contained herein  may be printed or  downloaded and 
redistributed for  personal, research  or educational purposes free of  charge and 
without permission. Any  commercial  use of Homeland Security Affairs or the articles 
published herein  is expressly  prohibited without the written consent  of the copyright 
holder. The copyright of all  articles  published in  Homeland Security Affairs rests 
with  the author(s) of  the article. Homeland Security  Affairs is the online journal  of 
the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS).
http://www.hsaj.org
RUSSO, PANDEMIC VACCINE POLICY  20
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME 8 , ARTICLE 4 (FEBRUARY 2012) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
